The Reserve Bank’s bulletin series returns in the September quarter of 2017 with a back-to-basics review of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In ‘The Transmission of Monetary Policy: How Does It Work?’, Tim Atkin and Gianni La Cava bifurcate the transmission mechanism into two stages, the first being a concentrated impact on interest rates, the second being the wide-ranging spill-over impacts on economic activity and inflation. Their core insight is that the housing market is responsible for propagating activity through the economy: it is where the transmission mechanism is at work. Atkin’s and La Cava’s analysis, however, would be improved if a consideration of the breakdown of the transmission mechanism was included in the light of what Larry Summers (2014) terms ‘secular stagnation’, a situation of high debt, low growth, low demand, low interest rates, and low inflation.
A collectivist society would never have adopted Fordism. So it is a curious thing that Fordism coincided with the ‘New Deal’, a period of unrivalled growth and low unemployment, generous government benefits, and strong labour union power, which taken together constituted — you guessed it — a collectivist society.
Alienation and the revolution of the automobile
Marx, and later the existentialist philosophers, theorised that workers became alienated from their works under capitalism because they were produced for others, and were instruments of profit and revenue for the sustenance of life in a commodity-exchange economy. It was with the advent of the Fordist production line that this alienation had taken on its most distinct and vivid character.
It begs the question: What was produced on those production lines? Were they really just cars?
They were nominally speaking replacements for the horse-and-cart. But Ford conjured up a very effective way of polluting the planet, from one combustion engine to the next, completely transforming the environment. Aside from the fact that a car takes you from point A to point B, they also revolutionised the world, introducing the modern conception of the city.
In this way it is not just a machine but the embodiment of an idea: the car is predicated on the assumption you would own a conveyance that could get only you from point A to point B, without ever asking anybody else for permission, or depend on a centralised public transport system, or a timetable that would sanction as much.
This blog discusses the combination of Gassendi’s religious belief with his Epicureanism. It explores how his commitment to Epicurean philosophy is distorted as a result, before determining whether his overall view is consistent. The original title of this essay was ‘Whole Resolved Into Parts: Pierre Gassendi and the Reconciliation of Atomism and Christianity’.
Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), 17th century French philosopher, priest, astronomer, mathematician, and scholar of ancient thought, is best known for his ‘Epicurean project’, an attempt to fuse Christian belief with Epicurean ideas. Through a close reading of chapter eight of the third book on Physics in his 1658 posthumous work The Syntagma Philosophicum, an attempt will be made to discern whether this enterprise of Gassendi’s is, on the whole, consistent. The main proposition is that, read historically, Gassendi’s synthesis is problematic, but approached through a mereological lens, it makes sense. Gassendi’s conception of atomism, and its attendant problems, are examined first. His reconciliation of parts (i.e. atoms) and the whole (i.e. universe) is assessed second. The problems of incorporeality and the void are analysed third. The paper concludes with an appraisal of Gassendi’s system overall.
This essay forms part of an assessment I completed for a prerequisite course on class in political economy, and is reproduced below. It should be noted I am in no way interested in Marx’s social theories, only his economic ones, so have imposed on The Eighteenth Brumaire my own interest in structure and agency, and have analysed it only to the extent it provides some insight on such themes germane to complex systems theory, the school of thought I identify with.
Karl Marx’s 1852 historical essay The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte explores many issues in historical political economy. One of the more interesting aspects of the work is its treatment of structure and agency, particularly with regard to the question of which of the two drives change. At face value, Marx appears to argue the case for both: that is, that structure and agency both compel change, as when it is stated that ‘men make their own history, but not as they please’ (Tucker 1978: 595). This paper seeks to fill a gap in the literature by proffering an alternative view, namely, that it might be the case that sometimes neither structure nor agency compel change. The main proposition is that the divergence of political and economic interests drives this behaviour. The paper begins by revisiting Marx’s analysis of the events that led up to the coup d’état of 1851. This is followed by an evaluation of his argument that in the EB class interests diverge. The analysis concludes with a critical analysis of the dynamics of structure and agency in the light of their inversion.
The Peripatetic theory of spontaneous generation is one of the foremost theories of the natural philosophy of classical antiquity. Having been accepted for two millennia, and only refuted as recently as the nineteenth century, it has proven to be a great legacy of Greek thought and its manifest reasoning. Its preeminence on the scientific stage has come to be as equally significant in the philosophical one, being embraced by materialist and idealist thinkers alike, as well as those on both sides of the theological-Darwinist divide. This paper seeks to examine how Theophrastus’ rehearsal of the theory of spontaneous generation illustrates the activities and philosophical orientation of the Peripetatic school. The paper first examines the historical context of the theory, before unpacking its theoretical and methodological background. The analysis concludes with an investigation of Theophrastus’ espousal of inductive reasoning.
The original title of this piece was: A Manifesto promulgated for the purposes of enumerating the Order and Evolution of Intrapersonal Communication in the determination of the Division of Labour.
In dedication to
DAVID JOSEPH BOHM
The psychological rule says that when an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as fate. That is to say, when the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of his inner opposite, the world must perforce act out the conflict.
ALL YE FORTHCOME—let us now appropriate Hilbert, and endeavour to wonder: oh, the division of labour! No other question has ever moved so profoundly the spirit of man; no other idea has so fruitfully stimulated his intellect; yet no other concept stands in greater need of clarification than that of the division of labour. It is nothing short of a miracle that the progress of society has become the certain if not involuntary concern of the individual. In contrast to primitive collective organisation, where each strives for his own self-sufficiency, his own preservation, today the individual strives for their own society’s self-sufficiency, their own society’s preservation. He distinguishes himself from others, breaking his association with the whole of nature, and the continuity that marks his soul. The individual has become merely the fragment of a structure, no longer instantiating the part of a whole. Continue reading “Intrapersonal Communication in the Division of Labour: An Allegory”
This is a story of an ordinary little boy named Charlie Bucket. He was not faster or stronger or more clever than other children. His family was not rich or powerful or well-connected. In fact, they barely had enough to eat.
Tim Burton’s masterpiece Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (2005) is only a remake of Mel Stuart’s Willy Wonka & The Chocolate Factory (1971) in name only. The film is really an ingenious and wholly independent adaptation of Roald Dahl’s 1964 novel Charlie & The Chocolate Factory. In fact it is difficult to believe, watching Burton’s film, that the depressive auteur ever saw the original. If it the case that he did, it is still yet a miracle how he conjured a remake as original as the one that has prevailed.
There are, on the other hand, aspects of the world concerning which we do not believe in the existence of any accurate regularities. We call these initial conditions.
This essay seeks to contribute to the literature by revisiting the long-standing debate concerning the ‘unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’, as first presented by Eugene Wigner. It draws upon the indispensability argument as a possibly reliable and well suited response, while noting that there are many dimensions to Wigner’s open-ended puzzle, and that not all of these lend themselves to a clear appraisal by the analytic-minded philosophy of the indispensability argument. The unconventional thesis put forward is that the indispensability argument falls short of expectations given its difficulty in accounting for the initial conditions. The paper begins by outlining Wigner’s ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ problem and the indispensability argument(s). The responses of the latter are then examined, before a model of the issues is introduced, and its attendant implications are conveyed.
The long-running debate about the spatial implications of financialisation has given rise to a gap in the literature, between the standard (or convergence view) on the one hand, and the orthodox (or divergence) view on the other. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by charting a middle course, differentiated from the current literature in both methodological and conceptual scope, with the main proposition being that: while financialisation has brought geographies into question, its spatial legacy lies not in any organised deterritorialisation of economy, but rather, in its structural, compositional and computational arrow of time (i.e. historical, irreversible time). The essay begins by reviewing the standard view, before presenting evidence to the contrary. Drawn from case studies in CIP deviations, banking networks, and the international division of labour, the alternative ‘complexity’ view is then explored, followed by a critical analysis of its strengths and shortcomings, as well as a discussion about the need for a reorientation of assumptions. The essay concludes with an empirical evaluation of the new theory.
Epistemic Access. What is the difference between Hartry Field’s version of the epistemic access problem for platonism and the original Paul Benacerraf version? Why was this change seen to be necessary?
In ‘Mathematical Truth’, Benacerraf (1973) presents two challenges that any credible philosophy of mathematics must meet: firstly, it must enable a coherent semantics, one that describes mathematics in a way that is uniform (or continuous with) non-mathematics; secondly, it must explain how it is the case that under the spectre of the causal theory of knowledge we come by mathematical entities in the first instance. This second challenge, however, or at least Benacerraf’s exposition of it, came to exclude important issues, and so had to be recast, a task eventually taken up by Hartry Field.